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Abstract—Blockchains are turning into decentralized 
computing platforms and are getting worldwide recognition for 
their unique advantages. There is an emerging trend beyond 
payments that blockchains could enable a new breed of 
decentralized applications, and serve as the foundation for 
Internet’s security infrastructure. The immutable nature of the 
blockchain makes it a winner on security and transparency; it is 
nearly inconceivable for ledgers to be altered in a way not instantly 
clear to every single user involved. However, most blockchains fall 
short in privacy aspects, particularly in data protection. Garlic 
Routing and Onion Routing are two of major Privacy Enhancing 
Techniques (PETs) which are popular for anonymization and 
security. Garlic Routing is a methodology using by I2P 
Anonymous Network to hide the identity of sender and receiver of 
data packets by bundling multiple messages into a layered 
encryption structure. The Onion Routing attempts to provide low-
latency Internet-based connections that resist traffic analysis, de-
anonymization attack, eavesdropping, and other attacks both by 
outsiders (e.g. Internet routers) and insiders (Onion Routing 
servers themselves). As there are a few controversies over the rate 
of resistance of these two techniques to privacy attacks, we propose 
a PET-Enabled Sidechain (PETES) as a new privacy enhancing 
technique by integrating Garlic Routing and Onion Routing into a 
Garlic Onion Routing (GOR) framework suitable to the structure 
of blockchains. The preliminary proposed GOR aims to improve 
the privacy of transactions in blockchains via PETES structure. 
Keywords—Blockchain, Sidechain, Privacy, Privacy Enhancing 
Techniques. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain is based on distributed ledger technology, which 
securely records information across a peer-to-peer network. In 
spite of the fact that it was initially made for exchanging 
Bitcoin, blockchain’s potential reaches far beyond 
cryptocurrency. The presentation of Bitcoin protocol by Satoshi 
Nakamoto [1]  in 2008 has stamped the starting of this new 
period of decentralization in computer program frameworks 
worldwide. 
The advantages of blockchains (e.g., high security and 
transparency) do however come at a price [2]. There is a privacy 
concern that blockchain technology is incompatible with Data 
Protection Regulation and ACT, which data must be kept 
private at the user’s behest [3]. In the current blockchain 
environments, the issue is not only that data is permanently 
stored on a ledger, never to be erased, but that by nature it exists 
on a blockchain which is irreversibly shared with the entire 
network. Although the pseudonym nature of blockchains is 
deemed to protect the users’ identity [4], reputation and privacy 
is a very challenging issue because it is still possible to trace 
back transactions to a specific identity through blockchain 
analytics techniques. As blockchain technology generally 
requires the storage and exchange of data on a large scale, it 
creates new concerns with the “Reputation and Privacy” of its 
users, and it also increases privacy compliance concerns for 
organizations adopting this new technology. Furthermore, the 
new applications of blockchain could even increase the privacy 
concerns of reputation and privacy in the near future. 
Protecting the privacy of financial transactions has long 
been a goal of the cryptography community [5]. Many 
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, do not provide true 
anonymity: transactions include pseudonymous addresses, 
meaning a user’s transactions can often be effortlessly 
connected. As a trivial solution, users may follow creating new 
addresses, but this does not make transactions anonymous as all 
transfers are globally obvious within the blockchain and will be 
available forever. Several recent studies have considered ways 
to connect a user's addresses to each other and to an outside 
identity [6-9]. 
This paper introduces PET-Enabled Sidechain (PETES) as 
a new privacy enhancing technique for improving the privacy 
of cryptocurrency transactions by integrating the proposed PET 
functionality into a sidechain. Our PETES takes the advantage 
of both Onion Routing [10] and Garlic Routing [11] into a 
Garlic Onion Routing (GOR) technique. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II reviews related research, while Section III gives the 
background knowledge. We describe our approach for 
improving privacy of transactions in Section IV. Finally, 
Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
There are many techniques used for anonymization of 
transactions and obfuscating the identity of an individual using 
blockchain technology. Coin-mixing [12] as an anonymization 
technique takes the advantage of third-party to remove the 
connecting link between an address sending a form of payment 
and the address it is intended for. Coin-mixing is useful in the 
context of Bitcoin or similar services that have digital identities 
present (e.g. transactions involving digital assets). Within the 
case of Bitcoin, coin-mixing is imperative because it will 
degrade the possibility of anybody to see where transactions are 
coming from and being sent as well, that can be connected to a 
particular client account(s) [13]. A few cryptocurrencies, such 
as Zcash [14], are now supporting anonymous payment scheme 
on top of blockchains using Transaction Remote Release (TRR) 
[15] that follows a layer by layer encryption scheme of Tor [16] 
in which the sender encrypts the new transaction utilizing the 
public keys of a few TRR clients (Bitcoin clients utilizing TRR 
protocol). A TRR node decrypts the received data using its 
private key and sends the data to the next TRR node. The last 
node publishes the transaction to the network [6, 17].  
The authors in [18] construct a full-fledged ledger-based 
digital currency with strong privacy guarantees, named 
Zerocash. Their results leverage recent advances in zero-
knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge 
(zk-SNARKs). They formulate and construct decentralized 
anonymous payment schemes (DAP schemes). A DAP scheme 
enables users to directly pay each other privately in  Bitcoin 
platforms: the corresponding transaction hides the payment’s 
origin, destination, and transferred amount. Similarly, the work 
in [19] explores the role of privacy-enhancing overlays in 
Bitcoin. To inquire the effectiveness of diverse solutions, the 
authors propose a formal definitional framework for virtual 
currencies and put forth a new notion of anonymity, taint 
resistance that they can satisfy. 
Monero [20] is a privacy-centric cryptocurrency that allows 
users to obscure their transactions by including chaff coins, 
called “mixins,” along with the actual coins they spend. The 
authors propose and evaluate two countermeasures that can 
improve the privacy of future transactions. 
R. Mercer [21] introduces a unique ring signature (URS)  
scheme that works with existing blockchain systems for privacy 
enchantment. He implemented the scheme using secp256k1 and 
compared its efficiency with other commonly suggested 
approaches to privacy on the blockchain. The authors in [22] 
have offered an efficient NIZK Scheme for Privacy- Preserving 
Transactions over Account-Model Blockchain that utilizes a 
homomorphic public key encryption scheme and construct a 
highly efficient non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) 
argument based upon the encryption scheme to ensure the 
validity of the transactions. 
III. BACKGROUND 
This section provides a brief background knowledge on the 
underlying techniques used in our approach.   
A. Onion Routing 
 
The Onion Routing attempts to provide low-latency 
Internet-based connections that resist traffic analysis, de-
anonymization attack, eavesdropping, and other attacks both by 
outsiders (e.g. Internet routers) and insiders (Onion Routing 
servers themselves) [10]. Onion Routing relies on using Public 
Key Cryptography [23], which allows it to encrypt layers of 
onions such that only intended recipients of each layer can 
decrypt it with their private keys. Onion routing is implemented 
by encryption in the application layer of a communication 
protocol stack, nested like the layers of an onion. Tor [10] is 
currently the most advanced implementation of Onion Routing 
and is an anonymous network overlaid on the public internet 
that allows its users to anonymously access the internet, and to 
use internal Tor websites that reside only within the Tor 
network. Fig. 1 shows that Onion Routing encapsulates data to 
pass from the predefined path of routers from source to 
destination. 
 
Fig. 1. Onion Routing encapsulates data from source to destination 
 
B. Garlic Routing 
 
Garlic Routing [11, 24] is a methodology using by I2P 
Anonymous Network to hide the identity of sender and receiver 
of data packets by bundling multiple messages into a layered 
encryption structure. It is a variation of onion routing that 
clumps messages together much like a garlic bulb has many 
cloves. The layered “onion” strategy of Tor implies that a single 
packet is encrypted more than once but it is still a single 
message. This strategy of Tor makes timing observations easier 
that are a method to correlate a Tor entry and exit node. I2P 
bundles messages together in a packet where each message is 
like a clove hanging off a garlic bulb. Tor’s routing is bi-
directional, meaning that data to and from the destination take 
the same path through Tor. Unlike Tor, garlic routing is uni-
directional which data take one path to get to the destination site 
and a different path to send data back to the requester. This 
makes observation more troublesome since it’s not conceivable 
to know what path the other half of the discussion is taking. 
Garlic routing is a variant of onion routing that encrypts 
multiple messages together to make it more difficult for 
attackers to perform traffic analysis and to increase the speed of 
data transfer. Fig. 2 shows the simple structure of Garlic routing 
where packets are considered as chips with a few pieces of data, 
where each piece of data is also a garlic with data pieces. 
 
Fig. 2. Garlic Routing of data packets in a network  
 
C. Sidechains 
Sidechains [25] are an essential innovation in the blockchain 
field with some interesting long-term implications and effects 
on the broader interoperability and scalability of blockchain 
networks. Adding new functionalities to the existing blockchain 
will make this technology realizes its potential more widely. 
The idea of sidechains originally come to extend the 
functionality of interoperable blockchain networks, where data 
can be sent and received between interconnected blockchain 
networks. Sidechain enables data flow between two blockchain 
networks in a decentralized manner to transfer and synchronize 
tokens between two chains. Fig. 3 depicts a core blockchain 
connecting to a sidechain with a two-way peg protocol [26], 
which allows direct transfers of a cryptocurrency from the main 
blockchain to a second blockchain and vice versa. 
 
Fig. 3. A sidechain connected to a core blockchain 
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
We introduce the idea of PET-Enabled Sidechain (PETES) 
with the aim to improve the privacy of transactions in 
blockchain-based applications, where sidechains can operate as 
a shield on stored data in the core blockchain. By using the 
knowledge of two-way peg protocol in enabling transactions 
between two blockchains, we propose a Privacy Assurance 
Module (PAM) to manage data flow according to predefined 
privacy policies based on data privacy requirements.  
Fig. 4 shows the conceptual view of our proposed PETES 
structure to ensure privacy policy of data stored in the core 
blockchain. PAM receives a published transaction and sends it 
to a PET-enabled sidechain which supports a peer-to-peer 
customized PET to deanonymize the transaction identity.  
 
Fig. 4. Proposed PETES structure to ensure privacy policy 
 
According to the figure, Privacy Assurance Module (PAM) 
sends and receives transactions in two-way peg protocol. A 
smart contract [27], [28] is a self-execute agent that 
automatically follows contract rules, and will be resided on 
blockchain for immutability. PETES consists of many smart 
contracts which are aware of our proposed Garlic Onion 
Routing (GOR) technique. A sender does not broadcast the new 
transaction, PAM receives it and initializes a path for the 
transaction from Entry node to the Exit node. Note that PAM is 
in charge of broadcasting the final transaction  after doing 
security process in sidechain. Fig. 5 shows the combination of 
smart contracts with GOR technique with the purpose of higher 
data privacy and information preservation. The process of 
data anonymization of smart contracts will be done with a 
GOR technique in the sidechain. 
 
Fig. 5. Inside our PET-Enabled sidechain 
 
Every smart contract on GOR is directly connected (or has 
the potential to connect) with every other smart contract, 
meaning that a GOR packet can be relayed from and to 
potentially any other smart contract. This is not where payment 
channels do not fully-connect the entire network, and where the 
network topology is publicly known for routing smart contract. 
Data fusion of the network topology and the small amount of 
information from GOR packets may still be enough to uncover 
information in certain circumstances. For example, if a smart 
contract has only a single payment channel connection going to 
one intermediate, then any payments sent to and from the smart 
contract wallet will have to pass through the intermediate node, 
which would be able to obtain a lot of information about the 
wallet node's payments regardless of the GOR used. The degree 
of confidentiality and privacy provided for transactions that 
take place on sidechains depends on what technology the 
sidechain uses, in our case we have used GOR technique.  If a 
sidechain fails or get hacked, it will not damage core 
blockchain. So damages will be limited within the sidechain. 
This has allowed people to use sidechains to experiment with 
pre-release versions of  blockchain technologies and sidechains 
with different permissions to the primary blockchain. Smart 
contracts will execute based on PAM policies in the sidechain. 
Also, if we need to make a change in the smart contract, we will 
be able to apply it to the sidechain. Privacy protocols can be 
easily integrated at the sidechain level. 
The privacy protection mechanism in PETES structure of 
our proposed GOR is more formally presented in Algorithm 1. 
In this algorithm, n is the count of the network paths from core 
blockchain to sidechain that the PAM selects for data transfer. 
The symbol dn is a different packet’s chunk that can be sent in 
n directions in a simultaneous manner. The symbol t is the time 
of data transfer inside the involved transactions or smart 
contracts. SK is the smart contracts allocated by the sidechain to 
core blockchain in accordance with PAM, and CKi is the 
cryptocurrency key for layers in multiple paths in the GOR 
technique. With the help of GOR technique, sidechain could 
prevent fraud and sending inaccurate information on the 
transaction and smart contracts through managing data flow 
according to predefined privacy policies in PAM.  
Privacy-preservation in PETES allows to search and access 
specific data blocks while hiding through GOP technique. For 
example, if A sends a file or asset to user B, both parties can see 
the transaction details, but C can see that A and B have been 
transacting, but they cannot see the details of the transferred 
asset that has an effective role in GOP algorithm provided in 
PETES. 
Algorithm 1. Garlic Onion Routing (GOR) 
Sidechain = Receive (Transactions & Smart-Contracts (SC))  
PAM→ Send (Policy) 
Sidechain→ Checking (SC) 
If (Smart-Contracts == untrust) 
     { Modify (SC)  
     Core_Blockchain =  two-way peg ( SC)} 
Sidechain= Record (field_T) // Recording some of features from transaction 
based on PAM 
H_trans_id (n) // hide transaction identity 
     Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (pkt_chunk) // is adopted to    
encrypt  
     Sidechain = allocate (SK)  
Sidechain →Encrypt_layer (send data (dn)) // encrypt and send packet’s 
chunks to Core-blockchain 
CKi= ECC (n, t) // cryptocurrency key for layers in multiple paths 
 Sidechain → Send_PKT_chunk// based on PAM policy  
    Core-blockchain → Received (Transactions & SC) 
Core-blockchain = Decrypt (Transactions & SC) // using private key and 
re-organize data 
PAM → Updating (Policy) 
        End 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes a privacy pervasive sidechain as a new 
blockchain-specific PET (named PETES) by integrating Garlic 
Routing and Onion Routing into a Garlic GOR framework 
suitable to the structure of blockchains. We introduce a PAM to 
manage data flow according to predefined privacy policies. 
PETES structure works beside core blockchain, also PETES 
structure is able to enhance data privacy and modify smart 
contracts. In the sidechain, we would be able to protect 
anonymity and confidentiality of users through the GOR with 
regard to the PAM policy.  
For near future work, the implementation and evaluation of 
the proposed framework is of the highest priority. We plan to 
implement PETES on a trust computing platform to be able to 
increase data privacy in open blockchains. 
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